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I. INTRODUCTION
S trict products liability law has grown at a feverish pace since the
concept was first articulated by Justice Traynor in the 1963 case of
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.1 As a result of its rapid growth,
the law of strict products liability is vast and complex, and has generated
a voluminous body of scholarly works, many of which attempt to unravel
the complex web of confusion woven over the last twenty-five years.
While the evolution of strict products liability has not generated as much
jurisprudence in Ohio as it has in other states, the Ohio law that has
evolved clearly reflects the national confusion.2 Frequently, the confusion
1 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963) ("A manufacturer is
strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used
without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect which causes injury to a human
being.").
2 See generally Note, Ohio's Rapidly Evolving, Frequently Disorderly Law of Strict
Products Liability for Design Defects, 14 U. TOL. L. REv. 395 (1983).
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both nationally and in Ohio results from the courts' failure to adequately
separate the many issues that arise in a strict products liability action.
The purpose of this Note is to focus on one narrow issue in Ohio strict
products liability law-the admissibility of state of the art evidence.3 The
Ohio Supreme Court has never addressed this question, and other
jurisdictions are split on the issue.4 Although it is impossible to com-
pletely extricate the issue of the admissibility of state of the art evidence
from other strict products liability concerns, the Note attempts, at least
as much as possible, to isolate the state of the art thread as it travels
through the cases, and deals with related "threads" only when they
become seemingly inextricably entwined with the state of the art issue. 5
I. STATE OF THE ART DEFINED
The threshold problem when considering the admissibility of state of
the art evidence is a definitional one. Over the years, a virtual plethora
of definitions of state of the art evidence have been offered by courts and
commentators alike. Unfortunately, no uniform meaning has emerged.
3 "State of the art" is defined at infra text accompanying note 11.
4 Robb, A Practical Approach to Use of State of the Art Evidence in Strict Product
Liability Cases, 77 Nw. U.L. REV., 1, 11 (1982). Courts not admitting state of the art evidence
hold that state of the art evidence is irrelevant under strict liability since it relates to the
reasonableness of the manufacturer's design choice. Id. See infra notes 82-90 and accom-
panying text.
Attempts to pass legislation in Ohio dealing with the relevance and admissibility of state
of the art evidence under strict products liability have failed. For example, § 2305.33(B) of
S.B. No. 67, 113th Gen Assy., Reg. Sess. (1979-80) passed in the Ohio Senate but failed in
the House:
It shall be rebuttably presumed that a product was not defective as manufactured
if the design of the product or the method of its manufacture or testing or
inspection which is alleged to have caused the bodily injury, death or injury to
personal or real property conformed with the state of the art existing at the time
the product was designed, manufactured, tested or inspected. For purposes of this
division, "state of the art" means the technical, mechanical, scientific and safety
knowledge in existence and reasonably feasible for use at the time the product
was designed, manufactured, tested, or inspected.
Section 2305.34(A) would have created a rebuttable presumption that a product is not
defective if at the time of manufacture the product complied with applicable government
statutes, standards or rules regarding product design, manufacturing or timing.
Several states have enacted statutes dealing with the state of the art issue. See, e.g.,
Arizona, Afuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-683 (Supp. 1975-80); Colorado, Coo. Rav. STAT. § 13-80
(1973); Indiana, IND. CODE § 4, Ch. 33-1-1.5 (Supp. 1977); Kentucky, Ky. REv. STAT. § 411.330
(Supp. 1979); Michigan, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A. 29-16 (Supp. 1980-81); Minnesota, MNS.
STAT. § 604.031 (1978); Nebraska, NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-21, 181 (Supp. 1978); New
Hampshire, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:4 (1978); Tennessee, TENN. CODE AsN. § 28-28-
105(b) (1980); Utah, UTAH CoDE ANN. § 78-15-6 (Supp. 1979).
' See infra notes 82-108 and accompanying text.
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The term was first articulated6 in the products liability context in the
1956 Illinois case of Day v. Barber-Colman Co. 7 In that case, the plaintiff
unsuccessfully sued the manufacturer of an overhead door for injuries he
sustained when the door allegedly fell on him.8 In rejecting plaintiff's
claim that the defendant had negligently manufactured the door, the
court stated:
[Tihe design having evidently been found safe in the industry by
experience and having been many times used safely by installers,
the state of the art at the time and the prior history of the use of
the product would not have indicated or required any material
change in the design or manufacture. 9
Unfortunately, as the term is used by the Day court, it is unclear
whether it intended "state of the art" to mean that the overhead door was
manufactured in accordance with industry custom, in compliance with
government standards, or that the door was designed and manufactured
as safely as was technologically possible. Consequently, "[tjhe.. . result
of this undefined birth of state of the art has been a continued confusion
over its precise meaning that has persisted to this day."'1o
The most apt legal definition of state of the art in a strict products
liability context is technological feasibility. Under this definition, a
product is "state of the art" if its design incorporates the "level of
pertinent scientific and technical knowledge existing at the time" the
product was designed and manufactured." A number of courts have
adopted this meaning or a similar formulation. 12 Technological feasibil-
Robb, supra note 4, at 3.
7 110 Ill. App. 2d 494, 135 N.E.2d 231 (1956).
I d. at 498, 135 N.E.2d at 233.
I d. at 507, 135 N.E.2d at 237 (emphasis added) quoted in Robb, supra note 4, at 3.
10 Robb, supra note 4, at 3-4. Indeed, at least one commentator prefers a broad definition.
See Spradley, Defensive Use of State of the Art in Strict Products Liability, 67 MINN. L. REv.
343 (1982) (State of the art evidence is the "aggregate of product-related technical and
scientific knowledge existing at any given time, in the industry itself, and in related fields
of inquiry."). Id. at 345.
" 1 L. FaUMER & M. FREDMAN, PRODUCTS LABlniTY § 6.05[15] (1978), quoted in Robb, supra
note 4, at 4.
12 See, e.g., Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 447 (10th Cir. 1976) (ordinary
consumer could not expect airplane made in 1952 to have the safety features of one made in
1970 any more than they would expect a Model T to have safety features which are
incorporated in automobiles today); Olson v. Arctic Enters., 349 F. Supp. 761, 765 (D.N.D.
1972) (court must view the alleged defect in light of the engineering standards in effect in
the year of manufacture); Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 640, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 890, 895 (1973) (design defective only when measured "from the state of the art at the
time of design"); Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Wash. 2d 208, 210, 683 P.2d 1097, 1099
(1984) ("the technological feasibility of an alternative safer design in existence at the time
the product was originally manufactured"). See also Wiska v. St. Stanislaus Social Club,
19881
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ity is the most apt legal definition of state of the art for several reasons.
First, technological feasibility is the meaning attributed to the term by
most laypersons and professionals. 13 Second, while the admissibility of
evidence showing technological feasibility under strict products liability
law is an open question, 14 evidence of compliance with custom and
government standards is relevant only to prove or disprove technological
feasibility, 15 and therefore is only admissible if state of the art evidence
is admissible. 16 Use of "state of the art" as an umbrella term encompass-
ing all three potential meanings only adds confusion to the already
muddled issue of the admissibility of state of the art evidence under strict
products liability law. Nevertheless, courts continue to use "state of the
art" to mean custom 17 and compliance with government regulations.18
This Note deals with the question of the admissibility of state of the art
evidence (i.e., technological feasibility) under Ohio strict products liabil-
ity design defect law.1 9 Since evidence of custom and compliance with
Inc., 7 Mass. App. 813, 390 N.E.2d 1133; Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d
1322 (1978); Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co., 527 P.2d 832 (Wyo. 1974); Robb, supra
note 4 at 4 n.9.
11 See, e.g., THE BARNHART DICTIONARY OF NEW ENGIjSH SINCE 1963 442 (1973) (state of the art
means "the level of scientific or technological development in a given field or industry at the
present, or at any designated, time"); the OxFoRD AMERICAN DICIONARY 668 (1970) (the
"current state of development or knowledge of a subject") and WEBsTER's NEW COLUGUIAT
DICIONARY 1136 (1973) ("the level of development (as of a device, procedure, process,
technique, or science) reached at any particular time usu. as a result of modern methods")
as quoted in Robb, supra note 4, at 5 n.15.
14 The bulk of this Note is directed at resolving this question.
"B See infra notes 136-69 and accompanying text. See also Robb, supra note 4, at 4 n.10.
("custom or standards of the industry may be relevant.., as evidence of what the actual
state of the art in that industry is.").
ie See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
17 See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 887 (Alaska 1979) (court
approved jury instruction defining state of the art as what other manufacturers of
construction equipment were doing at the time); Sturm, Ruger and Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38,
44 (Alaska 1979) ("[glenerally speaking, 'state of the art' refers to customary practice in the
industry."). See also Smith v. Minster Mach. Co., 669 F.2d 628, 633 (10th Cir. 1982); Robb,
supra note 4 at 4 n.10..
Is See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Dept. of Transp., 472 F.2d 659,670 (6th Cir. 1972); Buccery
v. GMC., 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 540, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605,609 (1976); Rucker v. Norfolk and W.
Ry., 64 I1. App. 3d 770, 780, 381 N.E.2d 715, 724 (1978), reu'd on other grounds, 77 Ill. 2d
434, 396 N.E.2d 534 (1979); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 219 Pa. Super. 479, 484,
281 A.2d 707, 710 (1971).
'9 There are two potential types of product defects in a strict products liability action:
manufacturing defects and design defects. Manufacturing defects occur on the production
line. A product with a manufacturing defect is one that differs from the rest of the items in
the product line because, for whatever reason, it fails to conform to the manufacturing
specifications. State of the art evidence is irrelevant in an action alleging manufacturing
defect because the inquiry in this situation is whether the product meets the manufacturer's
design specifications, not whether a superior design was feasible. With design defects, on
the other hand, the product has been manufactured exactly according to specification. The
[Vol. 36:105
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government standards is relevant to prove or disprove whether a product
is state of the art (i.e. technologically feasible), 20 and since Ohio, like
many other states, has tended to lump together all three evidentiary
types, all are discussed, albeit separately, in Section IV below. Before
turning to the discussion of the admissibility of state of the art evidence
under Ohio strict products liability law, some background information is
necessary. Accordingly, the following Section discusses the admissibility
of state of the art evidence in Ohio prior to the adoption of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A,21 and then traces the
evolution of the risk-benefit standard which grew out of section 402A. As
will be explained below, the risk-benefit test is the vehicle through which
state of the art evidence is either admissible or inadmissible under Ohio
strict products liability law.
III. THE Omo EVOLUTION
A. State of the Art Evidence in Ohio Prior to Temple v. Wean 22
Prior to the Ohio Supreme Court's adoption of section 402A23 in the
1977 case of Temple v. Wean,24 only one Ohio case addressed the
admissibility of state of the art evidence in a strict products liability
design defect case. In that case, LaMonica v. Outboard Marine Corp.,25
the plaintiff was struck in the eye by an unidentified object that was
projected from a lawn mower. As a result of the injury, he lost the vision
in his left eye. 26
LaMonica sued the mower manufacturer in strict tort liability, an
available cause of action in Ohio since the 1966 case of Lonzrick v.
Republic Steel Corp.2 7 The trial court found for the defendant, and the
inquiry in that situation is whether the design itself is defective, and state of the art
evidence is arguably relevant to gauge whether the product design incorporated the level of
technological knowledge existing at the time of manufacture. See Robb, supra note 4, at
13-14.
20 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
21 REmAThMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1982). See infra note 37 and accompanying
text.
22 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).
3 See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
24 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).
215 48 Ohio App. 2d 43, 355 N.E.2d 533 (1976).
26 Id. at 43, 355 N.E.2d at 534-35.
27 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966). Under Lonzrick, in order for a plaintiff to
recover she has to prove the following:
(1) That the product was defective;
(2) That the defect existed at the time the product was sold;
(3) That the defect was the proximate cause of the injury;
(4) That the product was being used for its ordinary intended purpose; and,
1988]
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plaintiff appealed. On appeal, he contended that the trial court erred in
restricting the admission of state of the art evidence to showing the state
of the art of the lawn mower industry in 1966, the year the allegedly
defective mower was manufactured. He sought to have evidence admitted
concerning improvements that had been made in the mower design
subsequent to 1966.28
Since the Ohio Supreme Court had not addressed the admissibility of
state of the art evidence in a strict products liability action, the LaMonica
court turned to the Illinois case of Sutkowski u. Universal Marion Corp.29
for guidance. The Sutkowski court held:
The possible existence of alternative designs introduces the
feature of feasibility since a manufacturer's product can hardly be
faulted if safer alternatives are not feasible. In this connection
feasibility includes not only the elements of economy, effective-
ness and practicality but also the technological possibilities
viewed in the present state of the art. If the feasibility of
alternative designs may be shown... we conclude that evidence
of a post occurrence change is equally relevant and material in
determining that a design alternative is feasible. 3o
Adopting the rule and rationale of the Sutkowski court, the LaMonica
court held, inter alia, that state of the art evidence is admissible for the
limited purpose of showing that an alternative design was feasible at the
time the item was manufactured or sold.3 ' Therefore, under LaMonica,
state of the art evidence was admissible in an Ohio strict products
liability action prior to the 1977 adoption of section 402A.32
B. Temple v. Wean and the Evolution of Ohio's Risk-Benefit Test
Prior to 1977, strict liability in Ohio was based on an implied warranty
theory.33 In the 1977 case of Temple v. Wean,34 the Ohio Supreme Court
adopted section 402A,3 5 the Restatement version of strict liability in tort,
(5) That the plaintiff's presence reasonably could have been anticipated by the manufac-
turer. Id. at 237, 218 N.E.2d at 192-93.
2 LaMonica, 48 Ohio App. 2d at 44, 355 N.E.2d at 535.
29 5 [l. App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749 (1972).
"0 Id. at 319, 281 N.E.2d at 753.
3'1 LaMonica, 48 Ohio App. 2d at 45, 355 N.E.2d at 535.
32 See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
3 For the elements of a plaintiff's prima facie case under the implied warranty theory,
see supra note 27.
34 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977). For a more extensive discussion of Temple
and its impact on Ohio strict products liability law, see generally Strause & Hedden,
Liability for Product Design in Ohio--A First Step Toward Solution, 11 AKRON L. REV. 663
(1978); Werber, Strict Liability Comes ofAge in Ohio: Almost, 11 AKRON L. REV. 679 (1978).
35 RFsATEMENT (SEcoN) OF TOarS § 402A (1982).
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"Ib]ecause there are virtually no distinctions between Ohio's 'implied
warranty' in tort theory and the Restatement version... and because the
Restatement formulation, together with its numerous illustrative com-
ments, greatly facilitates analysis in this area."3 6 Under the Restate-
ment, a manufacturer is liable if it sells a product in a "defective
condition unreasonably dangerous.13 7 This phrase is the focal point in the
Restatement, because the risk-benefit test,38 which is at the core of
today's Ohio strict products liability law, evolved from the Ohio Supreme
Court's post-Temple interpretation of those words. Further, the risk-
benefit test is the vehicle through which state of the art evidence either
is or is not admissible under Ohio strict products liability law. Therefore,
an analysis of the transmutation of "defective condition unreasonably
dangerous" into the risk-benefit test is essential to the issue of the
admissibility of state of the art evidence.
The first Ohio Supreme Court case after Temple that wrestled with
"defective condition unreasonably dangerous" is Leichtamer v. AMC.39 In
that case, the plaintiffs alleged that a jeep manufactured by the defen-
36 Temple, 50 Ohio St. 2d at 322, 364 N.E.2d at 271.
37 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1982). Section 402A of the Restatement reads as
follows:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller. (emphasis added)
Comment g of the Restatement defines defective condition as "a condition not contem-
plated by the ultimate consumer which will be unreasonably dangerous to him." Id. at 351.
Comment i states that for a product to be unreasonably dangerous, "[t]he article sold must
be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to
its characteristics." Id. at 352.
Comment g and Comment i are influential in the Ohio Supreme Court's formulation of
the consumer expectation test (see infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text). However, as
will be seen infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text, the consumer expectations test is of
little importance in a strict products liability action, at least as far as state of the art
evidence is concerned.
" See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
39 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981). For a more extensive treatment of
Leichtamer than given here, see Comment, Leichtamer v. AMC-Extending Punitive
Damages and the Consumer Expectation Test in Products Liability, 11 CAP. U.L. REv. 363-75
(1981).
1988]
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dant was defective because of the displacement of the vehicle's roll bar.40
The Leichtamer court found that implicit in the concept of "unreasonable
dangerousness" is that a product may be found defective in design if it is
more dangerous than the ordinary consumer would expect. 41 The court
felt that the "unreasonably dangerous" element of the section 402A
Restatement formulation was more important than the "defective condi-
tion" wording, since".., clearly a product cannot be considered defective
simply because it is capable of producing injury. '42 Therefore, noted the
Leichtamer court, the concept of "unreasonable danger" is critical in
establishing liability under a strict tort liability analysis.43 Since con-
sumer expectations are inherent in determining reasonableness," the
court held that "[a] product will be found unreasonably dangerous if it is
dangerous to an extent beyond the expectations of an ordinary consumer
when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner."45 Thus, the
Ohio consumer expectation test was born.
The watershed case in Ohio strict products liability design defect law is
Knitz v. Minster Machine Co.46 In Knitz, the plaintiff was a punch press
operator for Toledo Die and Manufacturing Company. On the day she
sustained her injuries, she left her work area in search of a more
comfortable stool. Upon returning, she noticed that while she was gone
her wastebasket had been emptied and the foot pedal which activated the
press had been moved. She leaned on the press bolster plate with her
right hand and attempted to move the pedal back into place with her foot.
While doing so she activated the foot pedal, causing the ram press to
descend with sixty tons of force onto the bolster plate. As a result, two of
her fingers required amputation. 47
In her complaint, Knitz alleged, inter alia, that "the press was sold
in a defective condition which was dangerous to user of said pro-
duct. '48 The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant and
the court of appeals affirmed.49 After reiterating the Leichtamer con-
sumer expectation test,5 0 the Knitz court noted that there are situations
in which "the consumer would not know what to expect, because he
40 Leichtamer, 67 Ohio St. 2d at 458, 424 N.E.2d at 571-72.
41 Id. at 466, 424 N.E.2d at 576.
42 Id. (quoting W. KmBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCS LuABiuTy 80 (1979)).
41 Leichtamer, 67 Ohio St. 2d at 466, 424 N.E.2d at 576.
44 In concluding that consumer expectations are inherent in determining reasonable-
ness, the court borrowed from Comments g and i of the Restatement. See supra note 37.
11 Leichtamer at 467, 424 N.E.2d at 577.
4' 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 432 N.E.2d 814 (1982).
47 Id. at 460-61, 432 N.E.2d at 815.
41 Id. at 461-62, 432 N.E.2d at 816.
49 Id. at 462, 432 N.E.2d at 816.
" See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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would have no idea how safe the product could be made." 5' In such cases,
stated the court, the policy underlying strict liability52 requires that
a product may be found defective in design, even if it satisfies
ordinary consumer expectations, if through hindsight the jury
determines that the product's design embodies "excessive pre-
ventable danger," or, in other words, if the jury finds that the risk
of danger inherent in the challenged design outweighs the
benefits of such design.53
Therefore, the Knitz court held that a product design is in a defective
condition if (1) it is more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would
expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2)
if the benefits of the challenged design do not outweigh the risk inherent
in such design.54 Under this test, the Knitz court determined that the
5' Knitz at 465, 432 N.E.2d at 818 (quoting Wade, On The Nature of Strict Tort Liability
for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 829 (1973)). The main problem with the consumer
expectations test is that it allows the manufacturer to avoid liability even though the
product is defective. The Knitz court noted that under the consumer expectations test,
"Idlifficulty could arise... where the injured party is an innocent bystander who is ignorant
of the product and has no expectation of its safety, or where a new product is involved and
no expectation of safety has developed." Id. at 465, 432 N.E.2d at 818.
The Knitz rationale regarding the deficiencies of the consumer expectation test was relied
on in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978), the landmark products liability case that first articulated the consumer expectation]
risk-benefit test adopted by Ohio. (See infra note 54 and accompanying text.) The problem
with the consumer expectations test, according to the Barker court, is that it treats
consumer expectations "as a 'ceiling' on a manufacturer's liability ... rather than as a
'floor."' Id. at 426-27 n.7, 573 P.2d at 451 n.7, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 233 n.7. In other words, the
low esteem in which the public might hold a manufacturer's product should not diminish
the manufacturer's responsibility to manufacture a defect-free product. As the Barker court
points out, under the consumer expectations test, a "manufacturer could frequently argue
that its product satisfied ordinary consumer expectations since it was identical to other
items of the same product line with which the consumer may well have been familiar." Id.
at 426, 573 P.2d at 451, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
52 "[T]he policy underlying the doctrine [is] that the public interest in human life and
safety can best be protected by subjecting manufacturers of defective products to strict
liability in tort when the products cause harm." Leichtamer, 67 Ohio St. 2d at 464-65, 424
N.E.2d at 575.
53 Knitz, 69 Ohio St. 2d at 466, 432 N.E.2d at 818 (quoting Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 430, 573
P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237).
14 Knitz, 69 Ohio St. 2d at 466, 432 N.E.2d at 818. Hereinafter, the second part of this
test will be referred to as the risk-benefit test. The test as a whole will be referred to as
either the Knitz test or the consumer expectations/risk-benefit test. Under the consumer
expectations/risk-benefit test, the trial judge first determines whether the nature of the
product is such that the consumer would or would not have reasonable expectations of the
safety of a particular product. If the nature of the product is such that the consumer would
have reasonable expectations, then the jury is instructed to determine whether the product
design is defective under the consumer expectations test. If the jury concludes that the
product is in a defective condition under that test, the analysis stops there and the
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1988
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plaintiff had made out a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
press design was defective, and reversed the appeals court. 55
The Knitz test significantly diminishes the importance of the Leich-
tamer consumer expectations inquiry since under the consumer expecta-
tions portion of the Knitz test the manufacturer can never be absolved
from liability.56 The manufacturer's only hope lies in the risk-benefit test.
This result led one commentator to note that "Ib]urdening a product
defect analysis with the conceptual baggage of the hypothetical ordinary
consumer adds essentially nothing of substance to a straight forward
risk-utility balancing approach . . . the [consumer expectations test]
needlessly protracts the analysis."5 7 Since the consumer expectations
portion of Knitz is of dubious significance, the appropriate focus of the
analysis of the admissibility of state of the art evidence under Ohio strict
products liability law is the risk-benefit test.58
While the Ohio Supreme Court has never addressed the admissibility
of state of the art evidence under Ohio strict products liability law, the
court intimated in Knitz that such evidence is admissible under the
risk-benefit test. In order for the jury to determine whether a product
embodies "excessive preventable danger"59 -that is, whether the risk
inherent in the design outweighs the benefits, the Knitz court stated that
it may consider "the likelihood that the product will cause injury, the
gravity of the danger posed, and the mechanical and economic feasibility
of an improved design. °60 The question of whether a product embodies
manufacturer is liable. However, if the jury finds that the product satisfies consumer
expectations, it then evaluates the product under the risk-benefit test. On the other hand,
if the judge makes a preliminary finding that the product is of the type about which the jury
would not know what to expect, the jury is instructed solely on the risk-benefit test.
55 Knitz, 69 Ohio St. 2d at 467, 432 N.E.2d at 819.
56 See supra note 54.
" Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to
Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 615 (1980).
" Courts using only a consumer expectations test have held that state of the art
evidence is admissible because "IsItate-of-art evidence helps to determine the expectation of
the ordinary consumer." Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 447 (10th Cir. 1976).
See also Brady v. Melody Homes Mfr., 121 Ariz. 253, 589 P.2d 896 (1978).
" See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
6o Knitz, 69 Ohio St. 2d at 466, 432 N.E.2d at 817 (emphasis added). In Cremeans v.
International Harvester Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 232,234,452 N.E.2d 1281, 1284 (1983), the Ohio
Supreme Court indicated that this listing of factors was not meant to be exhaustive.
Commentators have been rather prolific in suggesting factors to be considered in a
risk-utility analysis. See, e.g., Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does a Product Have
to Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301, 331 (1967) (5 factors); Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of
Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339, 359 (1974) (15 factors); Keaton, Manufacturer's Liability: The
Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYmAcusE L. REv. 559, 565
(1969) (4 factors); Robb, supra note 4, at 24 (5 factors); Shapo, A Representational Theory of
Consumer Protections: Doctrine, Function, and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment,
60 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1370-71 (1974) (13 factors); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers,
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"excessive preventable danger" necessarily implicates state of the art
evidence. This is so because offensive use of state of the art evidence by
an injured plaintiff which establishes that a product was not state of the
art clearly shows that the product embodies preventable danger, since the
manufacturer could have designed a state of the art product. Conversely,
defensive use of state of the art evidence by the manufacturer which
establishes that the product was state of the art clearly indicates that the
product does not embody preventable danger, since, simply stated, a safer
product could not have been made. Further, it would be difficult to
imagine that the "mechanical feasibility" which the jury is permitted to
consider means something other than state of the art. Therefore, al-
though the Knitz court does not per se use the term "state of the art," it
is nevertheless inherent in the court's use of the terms "excessive
preventable danger" and "mechanical feasibility" that state of the art
evidence is admissible under the risk-benefit test. In spite of the Knitz
court's seemingly lucid articulation of the admissibility of state of the art
evidence under Ohio strict products liability law, courts applying the
Knitz risk-benefit test have had difficulty with the state of the art issue, 61
and particularly with the related issues of custom and industry
standards. 62 The following Section addresses these problems.
IV. APPLYING THE KNITZ RISK-BENEFIT TEST
A. State of the Art Evidence
1. Ohio Cases
From the foregoing discussion, it seems clear that state of the art
evidence is admissible in Ohio strict products liability law under the
Knitz risk-benefit test as evidence of "mechanical feasibility."63 Two
post-Knitz cases confirm that state of the art evidence is admissible under
the risk-benefit test.
In Eldridge v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co.,64 plaintiff Eddie Eldridge
was injured when he tripped over a stump while pulling a push-type
rotary lawn mower backwards, thereby losing his balance and causing
the mower to back over his left foot. Eldridge filed suit against Firestone,
the manufacturer of the mower, alleging under a strict products liability
theory that the mower was defective in design because it lacked a guard
19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965) (7 factors); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products,
44 Miss. L.J. 825, 830, 840 (1973) (7 factors-revised list).
61 See infra notes 63-81 and accompanying text.
62 See infra notes 136-69 and accompanying text.
6 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
6 24 Ohio App. 3d 94, 493 N.E.2d 293 (1985).
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that would have prevented his injury.65 At trial, the plaintiff "conceded
that defendant's mower met the industry standard in effect in 1968,"66
the year the mower was manufactured. Plaintiff's expert testified that
several types of guards that would have prevented plaintiff's injury were
available in 1968.67 He further testified that
[Piatents had been issued for a number of [guards] during the years
preceding 1968; that placing blades or rear guards on lawn
mowers was economically feasible; that the hazards of unguarded
rotary-blade mowers, the severity of the injury they could inflict,
and the technological feasibility of constructing mowers with
guards were all known in 1968; that defendant's mower was a
defective mower when it was manufactured; that it was more
dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect; that it
embodied excessive preventable danger for which there were
feasible alternatives; and that the defendant's lawn mower was
not a state-of-the-art machine in 1968.6
In spite of the persuasiveness of this testimony, the trial court directed
a verdict in favor of the defendant.6 9 In finding that the mower was a
"state of the art" machine in 1968, the trial court stated that since the
industry standard in 1968 did not include guards, and the defendant's
mower was in conformity with this standard, the defendant had not
"fallen below the standard of the industry,"70 and therefore "[i]t is a state
of the art machine from 1968.'
The court of appeals reversed and remanded.7 2 In reversing, the court
opined that
6 Id.
66 Id. "Industry standards" as used here could mean either custom or compliance with
government standards.
67 Id.
" Id. at 95-96, 493 N.E.2d at 294-95.
69 Id. at 96, 493 N.E.2d at 295.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 97,493 N.E.2d at 295. The trial court added "[ilt is a standard ordinary old lawn
mower. Every time any of us use one, there is a risk." Id.
The trial court's opinion shows the confusion courts have had with state of the art
evidence. Here, the judge concludes that the lawn mower is a state of the art machine
merely because it was manufactured in conformance with custom and/or industry stan-
dards. Evidence of adherence to industry customs and standards should never be dispositive
in a strict liability action, since it is evidence of the manufacturer's level of care, which is
irrelevant in strict liability. Evidence of custom and industry standards is relevant in strict
liability only to show whether a product was state of the art at the time of manufacture. See
infra notes 136-69 and accompanying text.
72 Eldridge, 24 Ohio App. 3d at 98, 493 N.E.2d at 297.
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[t]he issue is not whether the lawn mower in question was the
state of the art, or that the lawn mower was similar to most other
lawn mowers built in 1968; the issue in a strict tort liability case
for an alleged design defect in a consumer product is to be
determined by the test stated in Knitz.
73
The court further noted that the statistics offered by plaintiff's expert
"could have formed the basis for a jury's determination that the mower in
question embodied an excessive preventable danger."74
In sum, the Eldridge trial court erred in confusing "industry stan-
dards" with "state of the art." The Eldridge appeals court rectified this
error by holding in essence that while "industry standards" may be
admissible as one facet of "state of the art" evidence, such evidence is by
no means dispositive. Rather, it was within the jury's province to
determine whether the guards were economically and mechanically
feasible, and to consider this finding along with the other Knitz factors to
determine whether the product was in fact defectively designed.
The question of the effect of state of the art in an Ohio strict products
liability action was also addressed in Sabel v. Newbury Indus., Inc.7 5 In
Sabel, the plaintiff was injured while operating a plastic injection
molding machine. After losing at trial, she alleged on appeal that the
trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that a manufacturer's
compliance with state of the art is no defense in an action for strict
liability. The appeals court held that under the Knitz test a manufactur-
er's compliance with the state of the art is not a defense but rather is one
factor for the jury to consider. 76 This decision is consistent with Eldridge,
since both hold that state of the art evidence is admissible under the
risk-benefit test to show the mechanical feasibility of an alternative
design.
While Knitz, Eldridge and Sabel indicate that state of the art evidence
is admissible under Ohio strict products liability law to establish me-
chanical feasibility of an alternative design, it is not clear whether either
compliance or noncompliance with the state of the art can ever be
dispositive on the issue of liability. The Ohio Supreme Court indicated in
Knitz that mechanical feasibility is just one factor to be considered;77 this
implies that state of the art can never be dispositive. If this is true, it
means that under the risk-benefit test at least two facially objectionable
scenarios can occur: (1) a manufacturer can be absolved from liability
where its injury-producing product design does not embody state of the
73 Id. at 97, 493 N.E.2d at 296.
74 Id. at 98, 493 N.E.2d at 296.
75 No. 10-197 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1985) (LEXIS, States Library, Ohio file).
76 id.
7 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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art safety features, 78 and (2) a manufacturer can be held liable for
designing a product that causes injury even though the product contains
every possible state of the art safety feature. 79 It is unclear from the Knitz
opinion whether the court intended these results when it stated that
mechanical feasibility is merely one factor to be considered. Indeed, the
California court o that originally formulated the risk-benefit test subse-
quently adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court in Knitz admitted, "we have
no occasion to determine whether a product which entails a substantial
risk of harm may be found defective even if no safer alternative is
feasible."8' In order to understand the effect of state of the art evidence on
liability, an examination of the opposing theories regarding the admis-
sibility of state of the art evidence is necessary.
2. The Negligence/Strict Liability/Absolute Liability Debate
One of the keys to understanding the issue of the admissibility of state
of the art and related evidence in a strict products liability design defect
case is an appreciation of the various arguments in the ongoing negli-
gence/strict liabilityiabsolute liability debate. Basically, there are two
opposing theories: one is that evidence of technological and economic
feasibility8 2 should not be admissible under strict liability, 3 while the
other theory is that evidence of technological and economic feasibility is
entirely appropriate under a strict liability analysis.8s
The thrust of the argument that evidence of technological and economic
feasibility is irrelevant under a strict products liability analysis is that
such evidence relates to the reasonableness of the manufacturer's design
choice, and therefore should be admissible only under a negligence
78 See infra notes 109-29 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 125-35 and accompanying text.
so Barker v. Lull Engineering, 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
' Id. at 430 n.10, 573 P.2d at 455 n.10, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237 n.10.
12 "Economic feasibility" refers to the extent it is possible to incorporate state of the art
safety features in a product without increasing the cost of the product to such an extent that
no one would buy it. As one court explained:
[P]rice is also a factor to be considered, if a change in design would appreciably
add to cost, add little to safety, and take an article out of the price range of the
market to which it was intended to appeal, it may be "unreasonable" as well as
"impractical" for the courts to require the manufacturer to adopt such
change .... [A] Cadillac may be expected to include more in the way of both
conveniences and "crashworthiness" than the economy car.
Dreisonstok v. Wolkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1072-73 (4th Cir. 1944).
" See Birnbaum, supra note 57; Wildman & Farrell, Strict Products Liability in
California: An Ideological Overview, 19 U.S.F. L. REv. 139 (1985); Wade, supra note 60; See
also Vandall, Design Defect in Products Liability: Rethinking Negligence and Strict
Liability, 43 Otno Sr. L.J. 61, 87 (1982).
84 See infra notes 91-108 and accompanying text.
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theory.8 5 This argument is premised on the provision of section 402A
which states that strict liability applies even though "the seller has
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product.
86
The case of Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital8 7 illustrates this
point. The plaintiff in Cunningham contracted hepatitis from blood
supplied by the defendant hospital. The hospital argued that since the
state of medical science at the time plaintiff received blood did not
provide a method whereby serum hepatitis could be detected, it should
not be held strictly liable.88 The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed:
[Wihatever be the state of the medical sciences in this regard, we
disagree with the defendant's contention.... [t]o allow a defense
to strict liability on the ground that there is no way, either
practical or theoretical, for a defendant to ascertain the existence
of impurities in this product would be to emasculate the doctrine
and in a very real sense would signal a return to a negligence
theory.8 9
Proponents of this argument believe that there is no place in strict
liability for any consideration of questions of "feasibility," since feasibil-
ity deals with the manufacturer's level of care,90 and should be admitted
only under a negligence theory.
The problem with this approach is that it ignores the difference
between strict and absolute liability. Strict liability does not require a
manufacturer to design the safest possible product.91 Although some
5 Robb, supra note 4, at 11, 14.
6 REsrA EMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRnS § 402A(2)(a), quoted in Robb, supra note 4, at 11.
87 47 111. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970).
s Id. at 453, 266 N.E.2d at 902.
I d. But see Olson v. Arctic Enters., Inc., 349 F. Supp. 761, 764-65 (D.N.D. 1972) ("to
refuse to consider the 'state of the art' . . . would be ... in effect placing absolute liability
upon the manufacturer.").
" Feasibility deals with the manufacturer's level of care because inherent in a
feasibility analysis are the following questions. Did the manufacturer use due care in
making the design choice? Were there better design choices available to the manufacturer
that it declined to use? If there were better design choices the manufacturer chose not to use,
the argument goes, then the manufacturer was negligent in its design choice. This
argument is flawed, and much of this Note is aimed at clearing up this misconception of the
differences between negligence and strict liability.
l See, e.g., Robb, supra note 4, at 23 n.93:
If manufacturers had to adopt every possible safety device in their product design
to avoid liability, the vast majority of consumers would be priced out of the market
for the bulk of consumer goods. As an example, every electrical appliance would
be required to have complex safety switches and electrical current regulators to
prevent the danger of shock. Like other commodities, safety is a function of
economic supply and demand, such that an artificially imposed safety device
requirement would cost more than consumers are willing to pay.
See also Weakley v. Fishbach & Moore, Inc., 515 F.2d 1260, 1267 (5th Cir. 1975); Evans v.
1988]
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scholars have stated otherwise,9 2 most agree that manufacturers are not
insurers.93 The original purpose of strict liability was to "insure that the
cost of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by
injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves."94 Therefore,
manufacturers should not be held strictly liable whenever a product
causes injury; liability should result only upon a finding of defective
design.9 5
There is some merit to the argument that allowing evidence of
technological and economic feasibility signals a return to a negligence
theory,9 6 since it is clear that questions of the feasibility of a safer design
go not only to the product,9 7 but also to the manufacturer's level of care
in choosing a particular design.98 The problem with both arguments
discussed above99 is that neither acknowledges that a strict liability
theory may incorporate some features of negligence without signaling a
return to a negligence theory. 00 The Barker'0 ' court aptly observed that
the risk-benefit balancing test is distinguishable from its counterpart in
negligence since, under a strict liability balancing test, "the jury's focus
is properly directed to the condition of the product itself, and not to the
General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 824 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966);
Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 93 (Tex. 1974).
92 See Justice Traynor's concurring opinion advocating absolute liability in Escola v.
Coca Cola, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1979) ("the risk of injury can be insured
by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business").
" See, e.g., Calabrese, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALu L.J. 1055, 1056
(1970) ("strict liability has never meant that the party held strictly liable is to be a general
insurer of the victim no matter how or where the victim comes to grief"); and Birnbaum,
supra note 82, at 600-01, quoting P. KEMTON & J. O'CoNNELL, BAsic PROTECTiON FOR THE TRAFFic
ViCTm, 242 (1965):
Underlying the whole body of tort law is an awareness that the need for
compensation, alone, is not a sufficient basis for an award ... An award is not to
be made unless there exists some reason other than the mere need of the victim
for compensation. Otherwise, the award will be an arbitrary shifting of loss from
one person to another at a net loss to society due to the economic and sociological
costs of ajudication.
4 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1963) (emphasis added).
"' See Keaton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30,33 (1973)
("the product must be defective as marketed in order to subject the manufacturer to
liability").
se See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
7 See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
9 See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 82-95 and accompanying text.
100 See, e.g., Robb, supra note 4, at 16 ("[w]ith conduct ruled out as a subject of inquiry
[under strict products liability analysis] the negligence concept simply has no content.").
101 Barker, 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
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reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct."102 While this may appear
to be an "artificial distinction,"1 0 3 the Barker court's explanation is
enlightening:
The fact that the manufacturer took reasonable precautions in an
attempt to design a safe product or otherwise acted as a reason-
ably prudent manufacturer would have under the circumstances,
while perhaps absolving the manufacturer of liability under a
negligence theory, will not preclude the imposition of liability
under strict liability principles if ... the trier of fact concludes
that the products' design is unsafe to consumers, users, or
bystanders. 104
The "elements of negligence" that are admissible under strict products
liability include state of the art and economic feasibility, because their
admission prevents strict liability from becoming absolute liability. This
is so because even under strict liability, a manufacturer should have the
option to design a product that does not embody a state of the art design
in order to keep it within the realm of economic feasibility. 0 5 Whether
the manufacturer exercised reasonable care (i.e. whether the manufac-
turer was negligent) in making this decision is irrelevant; the manufac-
turer's duty under strict liability is to manufacture a defect-free
product. 0 6 A product is by definition defective under strict liability if the
jury finds that "the benefits of the challenged design do not outweigh the
risk inherent in such design."'01 7 Therefore, the implication of the Knitz
court that evidence of mechanical and economic feasibility should not be
dispositive was correct, since such evidence is dispositive only under a
negligence theory.10 8
102 Id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
103 Wildman & Farrell, supra note 83, at 151.
lO Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 432, 573 P.2d at 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
105 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
106 See Wade, supra note 83, at 569 ("[a]lthough the actionable conduct of the product
may be the same for both actions, in negligence the plaintiff must ... prove negligent
conduct... ; in strict liability this is not required").
107 Knitz, 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 466, 432 N.E.2d 814, 818.
10' The practical effect of a showing under a negligence analysis that a product design
embodies state of the art safety features is a finding of non-negligence, since a manufacturer
can hardly be said to have failed to use reasonable care where the product could not have
been made any safer. See Wiska v. St. Stanislaus Social Club, Inc., 390 N.E.2d 1133, 1138
(Mass. App. Ct. 1979), where the plaintiff did not present any evidence showing alternative
design improvements, and the court held that "[tihere was no evidence upon which the jury
could base a conclusion, even with all reasonable inferences, that GMC had breached a duty
to design with reasonable care... "Id. See also Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d
495 (8th Cir. 1968) (duty to use reasonable care in design of automobile).
Some courts will allow the negligence issue to go to the jury even though the defendant
has demonstrated that its product embodied the state of the art. See, e.g., Dreiling v.
1988]
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The cases that follow illustrate that neither conformity nor nonconfor-
mity with the state of the art should ever be dispositive on the liability
issue. The first case provides an example of how a manufacturer can be
absolved from liability, even though its product design fails to conform
with the state of the art, while the second illustrates how a manufacturer
may be subject to liability for defective design even though the product is
state of the art.
3. Failure to Comply with State of the Art-the Boatland Decision
In Boatland of Houston v. Bailey, 0 9 the plaintiff's deceased, Samuel
Bailey, was killed in a boating accident. The accident occurred when the
bass boat Bailey was operating struck a tree stump, throwing him into
the water. With the motor running, the boat circled back toward him. He
was killed by the propeller."1 °
Plaintiffs1 ' sued under the Texas wrongful death statute, alleging
under a strict products liability theory that the boat was defectively
designed because it lacked a kill-switch that would have prevented
Bailey's death.112 A kill-switch is a safety device that automatically kills
the ignition when the driver falls overboard. 113 Kill switches were not
commercially available in 1973, the year Bailey's boat was manufac-
tured, although one inventor testified that he designed his "Quick Kill"
kill switch in 1972 and applied for a patent in 1973, that his invention
required "no breakthroughs in the state of the art of manufacturing or
product," 1 4 and that racing boats had been using homemade kill
switches for thirty years."l5 His invention consisted of a lanyard connect-
ing the operator's body to a device that fit over the ignition key; when the
lanyard is pulled, as would occur if the operator fell overboard, the
General Elec. Co., 511 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1975) where the court was spared the difficulty
of evaluating the plaintiff's evidence for sufficiency because the jury found that the
defendant was not negligent. Id. at 773.
109 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980). Although the defendant in Boatland was the retailer of
the product, not the manufacturer, the same test is used to evaluate whether the product is
defective.
For further discussion of Boatland, see Robb, supra note 4, at 26-28; Comment, Use of
"State of the Art" Evidence in Strict Liability Claims: The New Texas Standard, 33 BAYLOR
L. REV. 165 (1981); Comment, Victory for State of the Art in Texas, 21 S. TEx. L.J. 489 (1981).
110 Boatland, 609 S.W.2d at 743.
1 Plaintiffs were Bailey's widow and surviving children.
112 Boatland, 609 S.W.2d at 746. The Texas test for determining whether product design
is defective under strict products liability is similar to the Ohio test. According to the
Boatland court, "[wihether a product was defectively designed requires a balancing by the
jury of its utility against the likelihood and gravity of injury from its use." Id. at 744.
113 Boatland, 609 S.W.2d at 746-47.
114 Id. at 746.
'15 Id. at 746-47.
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ignition key device rotated and turned off the ignition switch.116 It was
clear from his testimony that while it was not the custom in the industry
to use kill switches, they were technologically possible in 1973, and
therefore within the state of the art.
Even though kill switches were technologically possible, the trial court
found for the defendant, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed.117 The
basis for the holding of non-liability was the finding that although kill
switches were technologically possible, they were not economically
feasible 18 and/or would have detracted from the boat's usefulness." 9 The
court explained:
[W]hen the plaintiff alleges that a product was defectively designed
because it lacked a specific feature, attention may become focused
on the feasibility of that feature-the capacity to provide the
feature without greatly increasing the product's cost or impairing
usefulness. This feasibility is a relative, not an absolute, concept;
the more scientifically and economically feasible the alternative
was, the more likely that a jury may find that the product was
defectively designed. 120
According to the Boatland court, a product that is not as safe as is
technologically feasible may nevertheless be non-defective under a strict
liability balancing test.12 ' The court based its holding on the concepts of
116 Id.
117 Boatland, 609 S.W.2d at 743. The intermediate court reversed the trial court, but the
Texas Supreme Court reinstated the jury verdict for the defendant. The intermediate court
found that Boatland's evidence that kill switches were not commercially available in the
year Bailey's boat was manufactured and sold should not have been admitted at the trial
level since that evidence was "material only to the care exercised by Boatland and thus
irrelevant in a strict liability case." Id. at 747. This rationale is a good example of the
philosophy (discussed supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text, and refuted supra at
91-108 and accompanying text) that state of the art evidence should not be admissible under
a strict products liability theory because it relates to the manufacturer's level of care, a
concern relevant only under a negligence theory.
11s Economic feasibility is discussed at supra note 82.
9 Boatland, 609 S.W.2d at 749. Impairment of usefulness is an important factor, and
may be considered under the Ohio risk-benefit test. See Cremeans v. International
Harvester Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 232, 234-35, 452 N.E.2d 1281, 1284-85 (1982) (stating that
Knitz listing of factors to consider was not meant to be exhaustive, and that "[o]ther factors
relevant to the evaluation of the defectiveness of the product design may include ... new or
additional harms that may result from an alternative design."). Id.
120 Id.
121 Courts in other jurisdictions have absolved the manufacturer from liability under a
strict liability theory even though the product did not conform with the state of the art. See,
e.g., Weakley v. Fischbach and Moore, Inc., 515 F.2d 1260, 1267 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[it is one
thing to show that the defendant might have designed a safer product and quite another to
show that the product he did design was unreasonably dangerous."). See also McClung v.
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economic feasibility and impairment of usefulness. On impairment of
usefulness, Dean Wade once noted:
[I]n a collision an automobile may possibly catch fire-no matter
where the gas tank is located or how it is protected. Should we
require every car to have an automatic sprinkling system, re-
gardless of how that might affect its gasoline mileage? . . .
Clearly, safety must be a relative matter, and a balancing process
of some sort is necessary to determine whether a product is
sufficiently safe-regardless of whether the suit is in negligence
or strict liability.122
As explained above,123 allowing evidence of economic feasibility and state
of the art under a strict liability balancing test prevents strict liability
from becoming absolute liability. Therefore, as in Boatland, a jury may
find under the risk-benefit test that a product is not defective, even
though it does not embody the state of the art safety feature(s) that would
have prevented the plaintiff's injury. However, such a finding is permis-
sible only where the improved design would not have been economically
or practically feasible, and if, on balance, the jury determines that the
benefits of the product design outweigh the risks.
124
4. Compliance with State of the Art-The O'Brien Decision
The 1983 New Jersey case of O'Brien v. Muskin Corp.125 illustrates that
a manufacturer may be subject to liability for defective design even
Ford Motor Co., 333 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. W. Va. 1971), aff'd, 472 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973).
122 Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VANo. L. REv. 551,568
(1980). A good case illustrating this point is Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577
P.2d 1322, reh'g denied with opinion, 282 Or. 411, 579 P.2d 1287 (1978) (there must be
"evidence from which the jury could find that the suggested alternatives [were] not only
technically feasible but also practical in terms of cost and the overall design and operation
of the project." Id. at 69, 577 P.2d at 1327). In Piper, the defendant chose to use a carburetor
rather than a fuel injector in the engine of a Cherokee airplane. While the plaintiffs were
able to show that a fuel injector would have decreased the risks of fuel system icing, the
court found that a fuel injector would have adversely affected other aspects of the plane's
safety. Id. at 70, 577 P.2d at 1327.
Another case on point is Self v. GMC, 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1974). In that
case, the plaintiff was injured when the car in which she was riding exploded. She brought
suit against the manufacturer, alleging that the car was defective because the fuel tank had
been placed in a particularly vulnerable position in the left rear bumper. The court found
that while it was technologically feasible to locate the fuel tank elsewhere in the vehicle,
another relevant consideration was whether an alternative design of the car, while averting
an accident like the plaintiff's, would have created a greater risk of injury in other, more
common, situations. Id. at 7-8, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
"2 See supra notes 73-87 and accompanying text.
124 See supra note 121.
125 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983).
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though the product embodies the state of the art. Prior to O'Brien, no
court had ever allowed a plaintiff to recover who did not come forth with
evidence of a feasible alternative design under a strict liability risk-
benefit test.126
In O'Brien, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of an above-ground
swimming pool for injuries he sustained when he dove into one of the
defendant's pools. When his outstretched hands hit the vinyl-lined pool
bottom they slid apart, causing his head to strike the bottom of the
pool.
1 2 7
In his complaint, O'Brien asserted that the defendant should be held
strictly liable for manufacturing a defectively designed pool, because,
inter alia, but for the slippery quality of the vinyl pool liner, his injury
would not have occurred. 12 However, plaintiff was unable to prove the
existence of a feasible alternative design. 2 9 To the contrary, an expert for
the defendant testified that vinyl was "the best material because it
permitted the outstretched arms of the diver to glide when they hit the
liner, thereby preventing the diver's head from striking the bottom of the
pool."130
The trial court took the issue of design defect from the jury, but the
appeals court reversed. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that a
product may embody the state of the art and still fail to satisfy the
risk-benefit equation.' 3' The court reasoned that even where a product's
design embraces the utmost in technological know-how, its risks may
nevertheless outweigh its benefits, and, if they do, the product is
defective.13 2 This outcome results, according to the court, when a product
for which no alternative design exists, is so dangerous and is of such little
use that "under the risk [benefit] analysis, a manufacturer would bear
the cost of liability of harm to others."'133 This does not mean, of course,
that the plaintiff will automatically prevail in a case such as O'Brien.
Rather, it simply means that the jury should have the opportunity to
126 Note, Strict Products Liability and the Risk-Utility Test for Design Defect: An
Economic Analysis, 84 CoLum. L. REv. 2045, 2048 (1984). See also Justice Schrieber's
dissenting opinion in O'Brien, 94 N.J. 169, 194, 463 A.2d 298, 311 ("[m]y research has
disclosed no case where liability was imposed, utilizing the risk-utility analysis, as a matter
of law for an accident ascribable to a product in the absence of a defect.., other than in the
absolute liability context").
127 O'Brien, 94 NJ. at 178, 463 A.2d at 302.
128 Id.
129 id.
130 Id. at 179, 463 A.2d at 303.
1-1 Id. at 181, 463 A.2d at 305.
132 Id. at 183, 463 A.2d at 306.
133 Id.
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determine whether the risk inherent in a product outweighs the benefits,
even where the product embodies the state of the art.
In his dissent, Justice Schrieber argues that the result dictated by the
majority transforms strict liability into absolute liability.2 4 Justice
Schrieber makes the error of assuming that since there is nothing
"wrong" with the product, the manufacturer should not be held liable for
defective design. This is a common misconception,13 5 and is based on the
natural tendency to define "defect" as a layperson would, e.g. as an
"identifiable flaw," rather than in legal terms, as where the risks of a
product outweigh the benefits. Under the risk-benefit test, a product is
per se defective if the jury determines that the risks outweigh the
benefits, regardless of whether the product has an "identifiable flaw."
This is so because under strict liability the manufacturer's duty is not to
design state of the art products, but rather to design defect-free products,
or, in other words, to design products in which the benefits outweigh the
risks.
Therefore, as O'Brien illustrates, a manufacturer may be held liable
under the risk-benefit test for producing a state of the art design where
the risks of that design outweigh the benefits.
In conclusion, under the Knitz risk-benefit test, state of the art evidence
is admissible to show the mechanical feasibility of an alternative design.
However, compliance or non-compliance with the state of the art is never
dispositive on the issue of design defect. Rather, an injury-producing
design is defective if the trier of fact determines that the risks inherent
in the design outweigh the benefits, regardless of whether the design
embodies the state of the art.
B. Custom and Government Standards
Evidence of industry custom and government standards is admissible
under Ohio strict products liability law under the Knitz risk-benefit test
for the limited purpose of determining the mechanical feasibility of an
alternative design. It is not admissible where the state of the art is not an
issue in the case, since offered independently it tends only to show the
manufacturer's level of care. The manufacturer's level of care, though a
14 Id. at 185, 463 A.2d at 310.
135 See, e.g., Robb, supra note 4, at 21. Robb writes "[S]ometimes a product incorporates
the utmost in scientific know-how, but the manufacturer could be considered negligent
merely for placing that product on the market .... [i]mposing strict liability in this situation
emasculates the notion of "correctable wrong" which constitutes the fundamental under-
pinning of strict products liability." See also Robb, supra note 4, at 20 ("where the product
is designed as safely as possible under the then-existing state of the art, . . . then that
product should not be considered in a 'defective condition"'); Birnbaum, supra note 57, at
645; Note, State-of-the-Art Evidence Relevant to Risk-Utility Analysis in Design Defect
Cases, 15 STON HAxL 120, 140-41 (1984).
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critical factor in a negligence action, is irrelevant in strict liability, with
the limited exception of proof of the technological and economic feasibil-
ity of an improved design. 136
The Ohio Supreme Court indirectly addressed the admissibility of
industry standards and custom under strict products liability in Cre-
means v. International Harvester,137 the only post-Knitz case in which the
high court discussed the risk-benefit test. In that case, plaintiff' 3 8
Cremeans was injured while attempting to load a crawler-type tractor
onto a trailer, when the tractor slipped and overturned. Subsequently, he
filed suit against the defendant manufacturer, International Harvester,
alleging that the tractor's lack of roll-over protection rendered it defective
under Ohio strict products liability law.' 3 9 The trial court granted
summary judgment for the defendant, but the appellate court reversed,
reasoning that "there were sufficient allegations in the pleadings and
depositions to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
'design defect could become unreasonably dangerous' if the benefits of
such design do not outweigh the risk[s] of danger inherent in the
design."140
International Harvester appealed the case to the Ohio Supreme
Court, 141 which determined that the Knitz test was applicable. 42 The
court then affirmed the appeals court, finding that a genuine issue of
material fact had been created by the pleadings and depositions, because
they established, among other things, that "federal regulations requiring
roll-over protection were being formulated at the time of the manufacture
of the crawler trailer,"1 3 and that "several models had such
136 See supra notes 71-112 and accompanying text.
137 6 Ohio St. 3d 232, 452 N.E.2d 1281 (1983).
1s Both Cremeans and his wife brought suit against International Harvester. For the
sake of simplicity, "plaintiff" will be used to refer to either Cremeans or both him and his
wife, as is appropriate.
139 Cremeans, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 232, 452 N.E.2d at 1282.
140 Id. at 233, 452 N.E.2d at 1283.
141 id.
142 Id. at 234, 452 N.E.2d at 1284. A disturbing aspect of Cremeans is that while the
consumer expectation/risk-benefit test stated in the opinion is lifted verbatim from Knitz, it
is stated differently in the Cremeans syllabus. In the syllabus, the court refers to the test as
having two prongs: "[iln determining whether a product design is in a defective condition,
a single, two-pronged test should be used." Cremeans, 6 Ohio St. 2d at 232, 452 N.E.2d at
1282. The implication is that the plaintiff must satisfy both prongs, e.g., both the consumer
expectation and the risk-benefit "prong." This, of course, is incorrect. (See supra notes 54-58
and accompanying text.) However, since the opinion expressly states that it is following
Knitz, and since the very rationale behind the consumer expectation/risk-benefit test is to
offer the plaintiff the opportunity to succeed under either part of the test, it will be assumed
that in spite of the Cremeans syllabus, the Knitz formulation of the test is the correct one.
143 Cremeans, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 235, 452 N.E.2d at 1285.
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equipment."'144 In stating that the plaintiff's allegation that federal
regulations requiring roll-over protection were being formulated at the
time of manufacture created a genuine issue of material fact, the court
was indirectly indicating that compliance with or failure to comply with
custom and industry standards are both admissible and relevant under
Ohio strict products liability design defect law.
Although it is not clear from the opinion, it appears that the plaintiff
was trying to show, through evidence of custom and the forthcoming
government standards, that the design of the tractor did not embody state
of the art roll-over protection. It also appears that the Cremeans court
intended this evidence to go to the question of the mechanical feasibility
of an alternative design, since the reason the evidence of industry custom
and compliance with government standards was declared admissible by
the Cremeans court was because it "establish[es] a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the benefits of the challenged design [out-
weigh] the risks inherent in such design."'1 45 This is so, said the Cremeans
court, because "[i]n focusing on the product design, basic justice requires
that all parties have the right to have attention directed to all relevant
factors for consideration in determining whether the particular product is
in a defective condition," 146 and those factors include "the likelihood that
the product design will cause injury, the gravity of the danger posed, and
the mechanical and economic feasibility of an improved design."'147
Although the Cremeans decision makes it fairly clear that evidence of
industry custom and compliance with government standards is admissi-
ble to show the mechanical and economic feasibility of an improved
design, courts subsequent to Cremeans have experienced difficulty with
the issue of the admissibility of this type of evidence. The Sixth Circuit,
applying Ohio law, has dealt with the issue twice, with confusing and
contradictory results. Interestingly, neither case cites the Cremeans
decision.
In Sours v. General Motors Corp.,148 plaintiffs father and son sued
General Motors (GM) for personal injuries sustained by the son when his
1968 Chevrolet Camaro slid off the road and rolled over in a one-car
accident. The son's neck was broken as a result of the partial collapse of
the car roof, rendering him a quadriplegic.
149
Plaintiffs alleged at trial that the structure of the roof constituted a
defective product, and the appeals court agreed.150 On appeal, GM alleged
144 Id.
145 Id.
141 Id. at 234-35, 452 N.E.2d at 1284.
141 Id. at 234, 452 N.E.2d at 1284 (emphasis added).
148 717 F.2d 1511 (6th Cir 1983).
149 Id. at 1512.
150 Id. at 1512.
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that the car roof conformed to industry custom and government stan-
dards and therefore could not be defective under strict liability. The
Sours court turned to dicta in Knitz to determine the validity of GM's
argument. Finding that the Knitz court stated that compliance with
industry custom and government standards is "only a guide and not
conclusive,"'' 1 the court held that GM's evidence of adherence to industry
custom and government standards was "properly left for the jurors to
factor into the calculus that comprises reasonable design in a case of
strict products liability.' 1 52
There are several problems with the Sours court's conclusion. First,
under Ohio strict products liability law, "reasonableness" of the design is
irrelevant; in order for a plaintiff to succeed, he need only show that the
product was defective. 153 Second, the Knitz court never stated that under
strict products liability evidence of industry custom and government
standards is "only a guide;"'-- when the Knitz court stated that evidence
of industry custom and compliance with government standards is only a
guide it was referring to negligence, not strict liability actions. 15 Third,
as mentioned above, evidence of industry custom and compliance with
government standards is not independently relevant in a strict products
liability action. Here, GM offered evidence of conformance with custom
and government standards to show that it exercised reasonable care in
designing the roof, rather than to show that the roof's design embodied
the state of the art. Therefore, the Sours holding is incorrect.
The Sixth Circuit addressed the issue again in Bailey v. V & 0 Press
Co.,156 a case in which the facts are strikingly similar to those in Knitz. 157
In Bailey, the plaintiff was injured while working on a punch press for the
Anchor Template Die Company. While he was working, someone called to
plaintiff from across the room. When he turned to respond, he accidently
stepped on the press' foot pedal, thereby activating the machine and
causing the ram of the press to fall on his left hand at the point of
operation. As a result, he lost all or part of four of the fingers on his left
hand.158
The press was manufactured by defendant V & 0 in 1954, without a
safety guard which would have prevented the accident described
"5' Id. at 1517.
152 Id.
153 Knitz, 60 Ohio St. 2d at 464-65 n.2, 432 N.E.2d at 817 n.2 (1982) ("we focus our
inquiry on the nature of 'defect' and dispense with any requirement for strict liability in tort
that a defect be unreasonably dangerous.").
"5 Sours, 717 F.2d at 1517.
155 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 464, 432 N.E.2d 814, 817.
156 770 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1985).
157 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
158 Bailey, 770 F.2d at 602.
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above.159 Among other things, Bailey sought damages based on strict
products liability, alleging that V & O's failure to install a safety guard
to protect against this type of accident rendered the machine unreason-
ably dangerous. 160 At trial, Bailey offered expert testimony that other
manufacturers had offered presses with more extensive safety features at
the time the V & 0 machine was sold, which, had they been incorporated
into the V & 0 machine, would have prevented plaintiff's injury. The
trial court refused to instruct the jury that a defendant may be held
strictly liable for failing to comply with industry custom for machine
guarding. 161
The jury returned a general verdict for the defendant, 6 2 and Bailey
appealed. On appeal, he asserted that the trial court reversibly erred in
refusing to instruct the jury regarding industry custom. 163 The Sixth
Circuit sustained the trial court on this issue, finding that evidence of
industry custom and compliance with government standards is irrelevant
in a strict products liability action.16 In so finding, the court stated
"Bailey cites no authority in support of his contention that a manufac-
turer's standard of care is relevant to proving product defectiveness under
a strict liability theory, where the product's condition .... [is] the central
[inquiry] and liability may be imposed regardless of the degree of care
exercised by the manufacturer.' ' 65
This statement by the Bailey court is incorrect. Bailey offered evidence
of industry custom and government standards to show that GM's ma-
chine failed to conform to the state of the art. This is the proper use of
custom and industry standards evidence. While the court was correct in
upholding the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that a defendant
may be held strictly liable for failing to comply with industry custom, 166
the court erred in its statement that evidence of custom and compliance
with government standards is completely irrelevant under Ohio strict
products liability law.
Sours and Bailey are confusing cases, since Sours incorrectly allows
evidence of industry custom, 67 while Bailey incorrectly disallows it.168 In
Sours, the court admitted evidence of industry custom for the purpose of
establishing the manufacturer's level of care, which is clearly irrelevant
1r1 Id. at 603.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 607.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. (emphasis added). The court is intimating that this evidence is only relevant under
a negligence theory.
16. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
17 See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
168 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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in a strict products liability action. In Bailey, the court disallowed
evidence of industry custom when it was offered to show that the
defendant's product did not embody the state of the art, which is precisely
the limited situation in which industry custom is admissible. If nothing
else, Sours and Bailey illustrate the difficulty the courts have encoun-
tered dealing with the issue of the admissibility of state of the art and
related evidence under strict products liability law.169
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Ohio Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue,
it is clear from case law that state of the art evidence is admissible under
Ohio strict products liability design defect law. The cases establish that
state of the art evidence is admissible under the Knitz risk-benefit test to
show the mechanical feasibility of an alternative design. While it is true
that an inquiry into the state of the art necessarily involves a limited
scrutiny of the manufacturer's level of care in choosing a particular
design, this scrutiny does not automatically transform strict liability into
negligence. Strict products liability is distinguishable from negligence
since under the former, the focus is on the product itself, while under the
latter the focus is on the reasonableness of the manufacturer's design
choice. Unlike a negligence analysis, mere reasonableness of design
choice will not absolve a manufacturer from liability under a strict
liability theory. Further, state of the art evidence, as well as evidence of
the practicality and economic feasibility of an alternative design, is
necessary under strict liability to prevent strict liability from becoming
absolute liability.
On the other hand, evidence of compliance with industry custom and
government standards is inadmissible under Ohio strict products liabil-
ity law, unless it is offered for the limited purpose of establishing the
state of the art. This evidence is not independently relevant under the
Knitz risk-benefit test because, offered alone, it tends to show the
reasonableness of the manufacturer's design choice, which is an irrele-
vant consideration under Ohio strict products liability law.
' Only one Ohio court has dealt with the issue of the admissibility of compliance with
government standards. In that case, the state of the art of injection molding machines was
at issue, and the court correctly allowed the jury to consider the government standards in
order to determine the "feasibility of a safer design at the time of the manufacture." Sabel
v. Newbury Indus., Inc., No. 10-197 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1985) (LEXIS, States Library,
Ohio file).
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Author's Note
On October 5, 1987, Ohio Governor Richard F. Celeste approved the
Ohio Tort Reform Act (the Act). Among other things, the Act codifies Ohio
products liability law and includes a state of the art provision.170 While
this Note was written prior to the enactment of the legislation, the
analysis remains relevant for statutory construction purposes. Further,
the material presented in this Note retains its vitality as to all claims for
relief arising before January 5, 1988, the effective date of the Act. 171
Cmus L. HuRLBUT
170 See Otuo REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.75(F).
7I The Act applies to products liability actions that are commenced on or after January
5, 1988 and are based on claims for relief that arise on or after January 5, 1988.
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